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The modal characterization theorem by J. van Benthem characterizes classical 
modal logic as the bisimulation invariant fragment of first-order logic. In this 
paper, we prove a similar characterization theorem for intuitionistic modal logic. 
For this purpose we introduce the notion of modal asimulation as an analogue of 
bisimulations. The paper treats four different fragments of first-order logic induced 
by their respective versions of Kripke-style semantics for modal intuitionistic logic. 
It is shown further that this characterization can be easily carried over to arbitrary 
first-order definable subclasses of classical first-order models.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
It is well known that Kripke semantics uses a rather limited set of first-order tools (including, first and 
foremost, restricted quantification over worlds) to interpret the language of basic modal logic. This allows 
to embed basic modal logic into the first-order logic (FOL) via the so called standard translation encoding 
a given modal propositional formula by a first-order one with a single free variable (this variable represents 
a world in which this modal formula is supposed to be true). In this way, basic modal logic is shown to 
correspond to a specific (so called modal) fragment of FOL which, in turn, is often called in this context the 
correspondence language for modal logic. Even though it is relatively easy to find out if a given first-order 
formula is a standard translation of a modal formula, it is not so easy to say when a first-order formula can 
be defined by a translation of a modal formula, which would amount to a description of expressive power 
of the modal fragment of FOL. A well-known answer to this more difficult question is given by the modal 
characterization theorem1 proved by J. van Benthem. The answer is that a first-order formula with a single 
* Correspondence to: Ruhr Universität Bochum, Dept of Philosophy II; Universitätstr. 150, D-44780 Bochum, Germany.
E-mail addresses: grigory.olkhovikov@rub.de, grigory.olkhovikov@gmail.com.
1 See, e.g. [3, Ch.1, Th. 13]. Another standard reference is [4], where the modal characterization theorem is proved as Theorem 2.68 
in a very detailed and accessible way.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2016.11.036
1570-8683/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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a special class of binary relations between models called bisimulations.
The modal characterization theorem has become a template for many other similar results characterizing 
expressive power of logics other than basic modal one. The developments based on the original result by 
J. van Benthem were of the following main types. First, one could modify the definition of bisimulation 
itself. For instance, once one understands the machinery behind the modal characterization theorem, it is 
fairly easy to design a version of bisimulation for the modal logic with universal modality. The second type 
of modification involves switching to another correspondence language. For example, in [8] modal μ-calculus 
is characterized as the bisimulation invariant fragment of monadic second-order logic. Finally, as the third 
type of modification let us note attempts (with varying degrees of success) to carry over the whole task of 
characterizing expressivity into a non-Kripkean semantic context and then to find there notions similar to 
bisimulation. A case in point here would be the so called topo-bisimulations.
Of course, these types are not supposed to be mutually exclusive, for instance, capturing the expressive 
powers of basic hybrid logic using bisimulations-with-names would be an example of result belonging both 
to the first and to the second type. An interested reader may find a survey of these as well as further 
results of this kind together with numerous references to the existing literature on this subject in [3, Ch. 1, 
Section 6 and Ch. 6, Section 5].
For some years, our own efforts in this direction were centered on obtaining versions of the modal 
characterization theorem for intuitionistic propositional logic and its extensions. We came up with the 
term asimulation as an umbrella term for modifications of bisimulation required to handle intuitionistic 
formalisms. It was shown in [10] and [11] that both intuitionistic first-order logic and its propositional 
fragment, viewed as different fragments of classical first-order logic, admit of a full analogue of modal 
characterization theorem where invariance with respect to bisimulations is replaced with invariance with 
respect to asimulations or first-order asimulations, respectively. The present paper extends these results 
onto the main versions of basic modal intuitionistic logic. This further addition to the set of existing 
versions of van Benthem-like characterizations answers a question which is both natural and non-trivial. 
Indeed, intuitionistic modalities are a kind of modalities, so one would expect that a version of modal 
characterization theorem can be proven for them as well. On the other hand, at least some of intuitionistic 
modalities involve a rather peculiar pattern of restricted quantification so that the problem of finding a 
suitable characterization of their expressive power does not seem to be very easy.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 starts with notational conventions, after which we introduce 
the main variants of Kripke-style semantics for the basic modal intuitionistic system.
In Section 3 we give a summary of the ideas and results from [10] which provide a common basis for all 
the results and constructions presented in the main part of the present paper.
This main part begins with Section 4, which contains definitions for all the four variants of extension 
of basic asimulation notion to be employed in semantic characterizations of their respective variants of 
basic modal intuitionistic logic. We also formulate here the main results of the paper, although their proofs 
are postponed till Sections 5 and 6. Then Section 7 is devoted to characterization of modal intuitionistic 
fragments of FOL modulo first-order definable classes of models. Section 8 gives conclusions and drafts 
directions for future work.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we first specify the main notational conventions to be used below and then briefly introduce 
intuitionistic modal logic with its four attending versions of Kripke semantics.
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A formula is a formula of classical predicate logic without identity whose predicate letters are in 
vocabulary Σ = { R2, R2, R2, P 11 , . . . P 1n , . . . }, where the superscripts indicate the arities. We assume 
{ ⊥, , →, ∨, ∧, ∀, ∃ } as the set of basic connectives and quantifiers for this variant of classical first-order 
language, which we call the correspondence language. A model is a classical first-order model of the correspon-
dence language. We refer to correspondence formulas with lower-case Greek letters ϕ, ψ, and χ, and to sets of 
correspondence formulas with upper-case Greek letters Γ and Δ. If ϕ is a correspondence formula, then we as-
sociate with it the following finite vocabulary Σϕ ⊆ Σ such that Σϕ = { R2, R2, R2 } ∪{ Pi | Pi occurs in ϕ }. 
More generally, we refer with Θ to an arbitrary subset of Σ such that { R2, R2, R2 } ⊆ Θ. If ψ is a formula 
and every predicate letter occurring in ψ is in Θ, then we call ψ a Θ-formula.
We refer to sequence x1, . . . , xn of any objects as x̄n. We identify a sequence consisting of a single element 
with this element. If all free variables of a formula ϕ (formulas in Γ) coincide with a variable x, we write 
ϕ(x) (Γ(x)).
By degree of a classical first-order formula we mean the greatest number of nested quantifiers occurring 
in it. The degree of a formula ϕ is denoted by r(ϕ). Its formal definition by induction on the complexity 
of ϕ goes as follows:
r(⊥) = r() = r(ϕ) = 0 for atomic ϕ;
r(ϕ ◦ ψ) = max(r(ϕ), r(ψ)) for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→};
r(Qxϕ) = r(ϕ) + 1 for Q ∈ {∀,∃ }.
For k ∈ N, we say that the Θ-formula ϕ(x) such that r(ϕ) ≤ k is a (Θ, x, k)-formula.
For a binary relation S and any objects s, t we abbreviate the fact that s S t ∧ t S s by s 
↔
S t
We use the following notation for models of classical predicate logic:
M = 〈U, ι〉,M1 = 〈U1, ι1〉,M2 = 〈U2, ι2〉, . . . ,M ′ = 〈U ′, ι′〉,M ′′ = 〈U ′′, ι′′〉, . . . ,
where the first element of a model is its domain and the second element is its interpretation of predicate 
letters. If k ∈ N then we write Rk (Rk, Rk) as an abbreviation for ιk(R) (ιk(R) , ιk(R)). If a ∈ U then 
we say that (M, a) is a pointed model. Further, we say that ϕ(x) is true at (M, a) and write M, a |= ϕ(x) iff 
for any variable assignment α in M such that α(x) = a we have M, α |= ϕ(x). It follows from this convention 
that the truth of a formula ϕ(x) at a pointed model is to some extent independent from the choice of its 
only free variable. Moreover, for k ∈ N we will sometimes write a |=k ϕ(x) instead of Mk, a |= ϕ(x).
A modal intuitionistic formula is a formula of modal intuitionistic propositional logic, where { ⊥, ,
→, ∨, ∧, ,  } is the set of basic connectives and modal operators, and { pn | n ∈ N } is the set of proposi-
tional letters. An intuitionistic formula is a modal intuitionistic formula without any occurrences of either 
box or diamond. We refer to intuitionistic formulas, both modal and non-modal, with letters I, J, K, possibly 
with primes or subscripts.
2.2. Definitions of basic modal intuitionistic logic
There exist different versions of basic system of modal intuitionistic logic. In this paper we only consider 
versions that have a Kripke-style semantics associated with them, and we will view these versions via the 
lens of their respective Kripke-style semantics.
Quite naturally, a Kripke-style semantics for a given version of intuitionistic modal logic is normally built 
as an extension of the Kripke semantics for basic intuitionistic propositional logic; that is to say, the models 
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left unchanged (cf. [9, Definition 7.1 and Definition 7.2]).
The new components in the models are one or more additional binary relations between states which 
are needed to handle the satisfaction clauses for  and . In the most general case, both modal operators 
are handled by separate relations R and R, although not infrequently one assumes that R and R
do coincide2 or are otherwise non-trivially related. It is also quite common to assume different conditions 
connecting R and R with the accessibility relation R, e. g. to assume that
R ◦R ⊆ R ◦R.
Both the condition that R = R and the other conditions mentioned in this connection in the existing 
literature are easily seen to be first-order definable.3 Since it was shown in [10] and [11] that asimulations 
are easily scalable according to arbitrary first-order conditions imposed upon the models, we will first 
concentrate on the minimal case without any restrictions imposed and then accommodate for the possible 
restrictions in a trivial way, by restricting the domain and the counter-domain of asimulation relations 
accordingly.
As for the satisfaction clauses employed in the existing literature on Kripke-style semantics for intuition-
istic modal operators, the following varieties seem to be the most common and general:4
M, s |= I ⇔ ∀t(sRt ⇒ M, t |= I) (1)
M, s |= I ⇔ ∀t(sRt ⇒ ∀u(tRu ⇒ M,u |= I)) (2)
M, s |= I ⇔ ∃t(sRt ∧M, t |= I) (1)
M, s |= I ⇔ ∀t(sRt ⇒ ∃u(tRu ∧M,u |= I)) (2)
This gives us four possible choices of satisfaction clauses. In the literature, these sets of satisfaction clauses 
are often viewed as more or less explicit manifestations of one and the same set of semantic intuitions. In 
this view, the reason why clauses (2) and (2) differ from (1) and (1), respectively, is that the former 
clauses lift up to the level of semantical definitions some desirable properties that under (1) and (1) are 
handled by restrictions on the class of models.5 However, in what follows, we will disregard this circumstance 
and will simply consider these four systems of clauses as bona fide different systems. The reason for this 
is that, like we said above, we find it convenient, in the context of treating modal intuitionistic formulas 
via asimulations, to omit whatever restrictions on models that are employed to equate these systems in the 
existing literature on the subject.
Each of the four semantical choices sketched above induces a different standard translation of modal intu-
itionistic formulas into classical FOL, thus giving a different fragment of it. Every such standard translation 
is an obvious extension of the well known notion of the standard translation of propositional intuitionis-
tic formulas, see e.g. [9, Definition 8.7]. More precisely, for i, j ∈ {1, 2} we will denote the (i, j)-standard 
translation, or the standard translation induced by adopting (i)-clause together with (j)-clause above, 
by STij .
Thus the inductive definitions of the (i, j)-standard x-translations run as follows:
STij(pn, x) = Pn(x);
STij(⊥, x) = ⊥;
2 This is the case, e.g., for all the systems mentioned in [13, Ch. 3].
3 As an example one may consider restrictions on Kripke frames mentioned in [1, Section 4], [13, Ch. 3], or [15, Section 2].
4 In this form they are given, e.g., in [1, Section 4].
5 E.g. the property of monotonicity. Cf. the motivation for the clause (2) given in [13, p. 46].
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STij(I ∧ J, x) = STij(I, x) ∧ STij(J, x);
STij(I ∨ J, x) = STij(I, x) ∨ STij(J, x);
STij(I → J, x) = ∀y(R(x, y) → (STij(I, y) → STij(J, y)));
ST1j(I, x) = ∀y(R(x, y) → ST1j(I, y));
ST2j(I, x) = ∀y(R(x, y) → ∀z(R(y, z) → ST2j(I, z)));
STi1(I, x) = ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ STi1(I, y));
STi2(I, x) = ∀y(R(x, y) → ∃z(R(y, z) ∧ STi2(I, z))).
In the definitions above the variables x, y, and z are assumed to be pairwise different, with y and z fresh 
for both STij(I, x) and STij(J, x).
3. Basic asimulations and expressive power of intuitionistic propositional logic
Just as Kripke semantics for modal intuitionistic logic is built on top of Kripke semantics for propositional 
intuitionistic logic, so our characterization of expressive powers for modal intuitionistic logic is framed as an 
extension of the earlier characterization of expressive powers of propositional intuitionistic logic presented 
in [10]. Therefore, we shall begin by briefly re-capitaluting the main results and notions of this earlier paper, 
as well as the intuitions behind them.
It is well known that, when viewed as a fragment of FOL, classical modal propositional logic defines exactly 
the set of first-order formulas invariant w.r.t. bisimulations. Bisimulations are binary relations between the 
Kripke models framed so as to capture coincidence of the sets of modal formulas true in the points of Kripke 
models related by bisimulation. In other words, bisimulations are intended to capture coincidence of modal 
truth sets for the given points. Of course, one can only infer the existence of a bisimulation from coincidence 
of modal truth sets when the models in question are ‘good enough’, that is to say, when the related models 
are saturated in an appropriate sense.6
In a similar fashion, basic asimulations are tailored to capture relations between sets of intuitionistic 
formulas true in the related states of Kripke models — and that, again, only within an ‘ideal’ environment 
provided by saturated models. The difference, however, is that asimulations capture inclusion of truth sets 
rather than their coincidence. Hence the name ‘asimulations’, which is intended to stand for something like 
‘asymmetrical bisimulations’.
Keeping in mind that asimulations are meant to capture inclusion of the truth set of the ‘left’ state of 
asimulation pair into the truth set of the ‘right’ state, one can better understand the intuitive meaning 
of different versions of asimulation given below. In this section we explain the application of this idea to 
the basic case of propositional intuitionistic logic. First, consider atomic formulas: since we now care about 
inclusion rather than coincidence of intuitionistic truth sets, we need to substitute the bi-conditional in 
the atomic clause of bisimulation with a respective conditional, thus getting clause (base) in Definition 1
below. Presence of ⊥, , ∧, and ∨ in our language then requires no further provisions since the preservation 
of the respective formulas will follow from the preservation of their conjuncts or disjuncts. However, the 
presence of intuitionistic implication calls for an additional clause. It is clear that asimulation will preserve 
true intuitionistic implications from left to right iff it will preserve false intuitionistic implications from 
right to left. This means that every counterexample to an intuitionistic implication in the right model must 
also exist for the respective world in the left model. Now, assume that (M, s) and (M′, s′) are two pointed 
6 Generally one must require here at least modal saturation; see, for instance, [4, p. 92, Definition 2.53].
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implication I → J at (M′, s′) is ‘matched’ with a similar counterexample at (M, s). Typically, the existence 
of such a counterexample means the existence of a successor t′ to s′ making both I true and J false. If we 
want to find a similar counterexample for I → J at (M, s), we need, again, to find a successor t to s with 
a similar structure of truth sets. Well, if we require that t A t′, we ensure that the intuitionistic truth set 
of t is included in the intuitionistic truth set of t′, thus getting that J is false at t as well. On the other 
hand, if we require that t′ A t, inverse inclusion of intuitionistic truth sets is obtained, thus ensuring that 
I is true at t. Therefore, the joint requirement that t 
↔
A t′ will do the trick, whereas any of its constituent 
asymmetric A-links would be insufficient. This explains the form of condition (step) in Definition 1.
Summing everything up, we are now able to give the following definition of basic asimulation:
Definition 1. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. A binary relation A is called a basic asimulation 
from (M1, t) to (M2, u) iff for any i, j such that {i, j} = {1, 2}, any a, c ∈ Ui, b, d ∈ Uj , any unary predicate 
letter P ∈ Θ the following conditions hold:
A ⊆ (U1 × U2) ∪ (U2 × U1) (type)
t A u (elem)
(a A b ∧ a |=i P (x)) ⇒ b |=j P (x)) (base)
(a A b ∧ b Rj d) ⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ c
↔
A d) (step)
One immediately sees that the notion of basic asimulation is another member in the series of such 
notions as partial isomorphism (employed in the formulation of Fraïssé’s Theorem, see e.g. [7, Ch. XII, 
Theorem 2.1]) or bisimulation (Van Benthem’s Modal Characterization Theorem). Now, it is well known 
that these latter notions are typically accompanied by a finitary version, which only preserves properties of 
truth sets up to a given quantifier rank k. Thus, one speaks of k-isomorphisms and k-bisimulations alongside 
partial isomorphisms and bisimulations. This is also the case with basic asimulations, and the correspondent 
finitary notion looks as follows:
Definition 2. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. A binary relation A is called a basic 
k-asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) iff for any i, j such that {i, j} = {1, 2}, any (ām, a, c) ∈ Um+2i , 




((Un1 × Un2 ) ∪ (Un2 × Un1 )) (p-type)
t A u (elem)
((ām, a) A (b̄m, b) ∧ a |=i P (x)) ⇒ b |=j P (x) (p-base)
((ām, a) A (b̄m, b) ∧ b Rj d ∧m < k) ⇒
⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ (ām, a, c)
↔
A (b̄m, b, d)) (p-step)
In order to explicate the sense in which basic asimulations and basic k-asimulations capture the expressive 
powers of intuitionistic propositional logic, we need first to define the notion of invariance of a formula w.r.t. 
a class of binary relations:
Definition 3. Let β be a class of relations such that for any A ∈ β there is a Θ and there are Θ-models M1
and M2 such that (p-type) holds. Then a formula ϕ(x) is said to be invariant with respect to β, iff for any 
A ∈ β, for any corresponding Θ-models M1 and M2, and for any a ∈ U1 and b ∈ U2 it is true that:
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In view of this definition, when we say that basic asimulations and basic k-asimulations offer a semantic 
characterization of intuitionistic propositional logic, we mean that the following theorems can be established:
Theorem 1. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}. A formula ϕ(x) is equivalent to an (i, j)-standard x-translation of an intu-
itionistic formula iff ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to basic asimulations.
Theorem 2. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}. A formula ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to basic k-asimulations iff there exists 
an intuitionistic formula I such that r(STij(I, x)) ≤ k and ϕ(x) is equivalent to STij(I, x).
Instantiation of i and j above can be arbitrary, since all of the above-defined standard translations 
coincide on the set of intuitionistic propositional formulas.
Theorem 2 yields as an immediate corollary the following ‘parametrized version’ of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}. A formula ϕ(x) is equivalent to an (i, j)-standard x-translation of an intu-
itionistic formula iff there exists a k ∈ N such that ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to basic k-asimulations.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 were stated and proved in [10] as Theorem 4.16 and Theorem 3.12, respectively. 
Theorem 2 was not proved there; in fact, the proof of Corollary 1 given in [10] established a somewhat 
weaker proposition. In this paper we do not give a separate proof of Theorem 2 either. However, in the 
following sections one can find full proofs of analogous propositions w.r.t. modal intuitionistic logic and 
modal asimulations, namely Theorems 3 and 4 and Corollary 2. Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollary 1
can be obtained from these proofs by simply deleting all inductive cases not relevant to the notion of basic 
asimulation and language of intuitionistic propositional logic.7
Before we leave the subject of basic asimulation, we would like to consider a typical example of asimulation 
relation and offer some comments on it.
Example 1. Consider Σ-models M1, M2 with U1 = {w1, w2, w3}, U2 = {v1, v2}, ι1(P ) = {w3}, ι2(P ) = ∅. 
We further set that ι1(R), ι2(R) are reflexive and transitive closures of relations r1 and r2 respectively, 
assuming that
r1 := {(w1, w2), (w1, w3)}; r2 := {(v1, v2)},
and we set all the other binary and unary predicate constants in Σ to ∅. Then the following binary relation A
(see Fig. 1) is, according to the Definition 1, a basic asimulation from (M1, w1) to (M2, v1):
A := {(w1, v1), (v1, w2), (w2, v1), (w2, v2), (v2, w2)}.
Regarding the above example one may note, in the first place, that, in view of the foregoing theorems, the 
example shows that the correspondence formula ∃y(R(x, y) ∧P (y)) is not definable by a standard translation 
of an intuitionistic propositional formula. Secondly, note the pivotal role of asymmetry of A in this result. 
Were we to enforce symmetry with respect to the initial link w1 A v1, we would have to look then for 
counterparts of w3, and would consequently fail to construct an asimulation at all. On the other hand, one 
7 However, in [10] these statements were proved for a slightly different language which did not contain  among its basic connec-
tives. As for Theorem 2, one direction of it, i.e. that if a formula is equivalent to a standard translation of an intuitionistic formula 
of degree not exceeding k, then this formula is invariant w.r.t. basic k-asimulations, is an easy consequence of [10, Lemma 3.3]. In 
the other direction, however, one can extract from the proofs given in [10] only a somewhat weaker statement that every formula 
invariant w.r.t. basic k-asimulations is equivalent to a standard translation of intuitionistic formula of degree not exceeding k + 2. 
Thus the proofs given in this paper, among other things, somewhat strengthen the results of [10].
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should also note that the role of asymmetry in basic asimulations is clearly limited. Indeed, due to the form of 
clause (step), all the asimulation links necessarily generated from other links have to be symmetric, and, with 
symmetry enforced, a basic asimulation is just a regular bisimulation. Therefore, every basic asimulation 
can be ‘trimmed’ so that, in a sense, almost all of the asymmetric links are eliminated. This situation is 
probably one of the reasons for the existence of results like [14, Theorem A.1] which shows that if one (1) 
limits one’s attention to the class of intended models of intuitionistic propositional logic (i.e. assumes that 
R is a pre-order, etc.) and (2) only looks at the monotonic formulas of the correspondence language, then 
expressive powers of intuitionistic propositional logic can be described already with bisimulation invariance.
However, the situation looks more complicated when one considers natural extensions of intuitionistic 
propositional logic, like intuitionistic modal or first-order logic. In the respective versions of asimulation 
relations for these extensions, the asymmetric links can be reinstated at any later stage. It is thus not clear 
if any analogues of [14, Theorem A.1] are possible w.r.t. these extensions, and if yes, then what the form of 
the corresponding restrictions would be like.
4. Characterization of modal intuitionistic formulas: definitions and main results
Our aim in the present paper is to characterize the expressive power of the four fragments of the corre-
spondence language induced by the four above-mentioned versions of (i, j)-standard translation of modal 
intuitionistic formulas via the suitable extension of basic asimulation. We will begin by giving strict defini-
tions of the four required extensions, and then formulate the two versions of our main result for all the four 
considered fragments of the correspondence language in one full sweep.
Let us begin with some easy cases. It is clear that the clauses (1) and (1) are just definitions of box 
and diamond in classical modal propositional logic, so the expressive powers induced by these clauses can 
be captured by a version of the clause used in the definition of bisimulation. One only needs to take into an 
account the asymmetric setting at hand in order to come up with an appropriate weakening of bisimulation 
conditions. Thus, since we want classic modal diamonds to be preserved from left to right, we need to ensure 
that ‘verifying successors’ of a given state are preserved in the same direction; hence the clause (diam-1)
below. On the other hand, if we want classic modal boxes to be preserved from left to right, we need to 
secure the transition of ‘falsifying successors’ in the reverse direction, i.e., from right to left. Hence the form 
of the clause (box-1) below. The clause (2) only differs from (1) in that relation R is substituted here by 
a composition of relations R ◦R and, mutatis mutandis, can be dealt with in a similar way.
The above considerations contain enough intuitive motivation for an attempt to define extensions of basic 
asimulations and k-asimulations for two of the four fragments of the correspondence language that we treat 
in this paper. An extension of basic (k-)asimulation that is intended to capture expressive powers of the 
set of (i, j)-standard translations of modal intuitionistic formulas we will name (i, j)-modal (k-)asimulation. 
Thus, the above considerations motivate the definitions of (i, j)-modal (k-)asimulation for all i ∈ {1, 2} and 
j = 1. The respective definitions look as follows:
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k-asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) iff A is a basic k-asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) and for any i, j
such that {i, j} = {1, 2}, any (ām, a, c) ∈ Um+2i , (b̄m, b, d) ∈ Um+2j , the following conditions hold:
((ām, a) A (b̄m, b) ∧ b Rj d ∧ d Rj f ∧m + 1 < k) ⇒
⇒ ∃c, e ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ c Ri e ∧ (ām, a, c, e) A (b̄m, b, d, f)) (p-box-2)
((ām, a) A (b̄m, b) ∧ a Ri c ∧m < k) ⇒
⇒ ∃d ∈ Uj(b Rj d ∧ (ām, a, c) A (b̄m, b, d)) (p-diam-1)
Definition 5. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. A binary relation A is called a (2, 1)-modal 
asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) iff A is a basic asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) and for any i, j such 
that {i, j} = {1, 2}, any a, c ∈ Ui, b, d ∈ Uj , the following conditions hold:
(a A b ∧ b Rj d ∧ d Rj f) ⇒ ∃c, e ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ c Ri e ∧ e A f) (box-2)
(a A b ∧ a Ri c) ⇒ ∃d ∈ Uj(b Rj d ∧ c A d) (diam-1)
Definition 6. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. A binary relation A is called a (1, 1)-modal 
k-asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) iff A is a basic k-asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) and for any 
i, j such that {i, j} = {1, 2}, any (ām, a, c) ∈ Um+2i , (b̄m, b, d) ∈ Um+2j , condition (p-diam-1) is satisfied 
together with the following condition:
((ām, a) A (b̄m, b) ∧ b Rj d ∧m < k) ⇒
⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ (ām, a, c) A (b̄m, b, d)) (p-box-1)
Definition 7. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. A binary relation A is called a (1, 1)-modal 
asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) iff A is a basic asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) and for any i, j
such that {i, j} = {1, 2}, any a, c ∈ Ui, b, d ∈ Uj , condition (diam-1) is satisfied together with the following 
condition:
(a A b ∧ b Rj d) ⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ c A d) (box-1)
If, instead of using clause (1), one chooses clause (2), things get somewhat more complicated. The 
problem is that in this case relations between the truth sets of points in respective Kripke models seem to 
be insufficient to transfer formulas of the form I along asimulation links. Assume, again, that we have 
two pointed models (M, s) and (M′, s′), and for an asimulation A we have that s A s′. According to (2), 
a standard translation of I is a universal formula of the correspondence language, therefore, we need to 
ensure that any counterexample to I at (M′, s′) is matched by an analogous counterexample at (M, s). 
Now, such a counterexample must be an R-successor t′ to s′ in M′ such that none of R-successors of t′
verifies I, so we need to find an R-successor t of s in M which has no R-successors verifying I. The problem, 
however, is that this property of successors cannot be defined by any modal intuitionistic formula J in any 
of the two logics induced by (2), if we do not put any non-trivial restrictions onto R and R. Moreover, it 
follows from Example 2 below that this indefinability persists even if we require that (Σ \{R, R})-reducts 
of the models in question are intended models of intuitionistic propositional logic, that is to say, have 
monotonic valuations for unary predicates and have R as preorder. Incidentally, Example 3 shows that the 
same holds for the negation of this property, that is to say, for the property ‘there are some R-successors 
verifying a given formula’.
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s that it satisfies t A t′, or t 
↔
A t′, or, it appears, any other natural combination of conditions mentioning 
A alone. A straightforward solution to this difficulty would be to introduce another binary relation B
which would be able to preserve the property ‘there are no R-successors verifying a given formula’ in 
the right-to-left direction, or, by contraposition, the property ‘there are some R-successors verifying a 
given formula’ in the reverse, left-to-right direction. In this way, we will be able to handle the problem in a 
separate ‘compartment’ of asimulation. It is a matter of arbitrary choice which of the two properties will be 
preserved along direct B-links and which according to the reverse ones. We choose to stipulate that direct 
B-links ensure the preservation of the existence of R-successors verifying a given formula, whereas the 
inverse B-links ensure the preservation of absence of R-successors verifying a given formula.
Under this reading, the new relation B will have no direct connections with the truth sets of the related 
states, but it will have strong connections with the truth sets of both R-successors and R-predecessors of 
these states. Indeed, if s A s′, then every R-successor t′ of s′ that has no R-successors verifying I must 
have a matching R-successor t of s. This means that one must require that t B t′, which motivates the 
form of clause (diam-2(1)) in Definitions 9 and 11 below. On the other hand, assume that t B t′. If a modal 
intuitionistic formula I is verified by an R-successor u of t, there must be a matching R-successor u′ of 
t′ verifying the same formula, else the property of ‘no R-successors verifying a given formula’ will not be 
preserved along the reverse B-link from t′ to t. Hence the clause (diam-2(2)) in Definitions 9 and 11. The 
foregoing observations motivate the following definitions:
Definition 8. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. An ordered couple of binary relations (A, B)
is called a (2, 2)-modal k-asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) iff A is a basic k-asimulation from (M1, t)
to (M2, u) and for any i, j such that {i, j} = {1, 2}, any (ām, a, c) ∈ Um+2i , (b̄m, b, d) ∈ Um+2j condition 




((Un1 × Un2 ) ∪ (Un2 × Un1 )) (p-B-type)
((ām, a) A (b̄m, b) ∧ b Rj d ∧m + 1 < k) ⇒
⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ (ām, a, c) B (b̄m, b, d)) (p-diam-2(1))
((ām, a) B (b̄m, b) ∧ a Ri c ∧m < k) ⇒
⇒ ∃d ∈ Uj(b Rj d ∧ (ām, a, c) A (b̄m, b, d)) (p-diam-2(2))
Definition 9. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. An ordered couple of binary relations (A, B) is 
called a (2, 2)-modal asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) iff A is a basic asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u)
and for any i, j such that {i, j} = {1, 2}, any a, c ∈ Ui, b, d ∈ Uj condition (box-2) is satisfied together with 
the following conditions:
B ⊆ (U1 × U2) ∪ (U2 × U1) (B-type)
(a A b ∧ b Rj d) ⇒ ∃c ∈ Ui(a Ri c ∧ c B d) (diam-2(1))
(a B b ∧ a Ri c) ⇒ ∃d ∈ Uj(b Rj d ∧ c A d) (diam-2(2))
The only case left is the one where one defines the satisfaction relation by using (2) combined with (1). 
The respective definitions simply re-shuffle the conditions mentioned in the previous versions:
Definition 10. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. An ordered couple of binary relation (A, B)
is called a (1, 2)-modal k-asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) iff A is a basic k-asimulation from (M1, t)
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(p-diam-2(1)), and (p-diam-2(2)) are satisfied.
Definition 11. Let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models. An ordered couple of binary relation (A, B) is 
called a (1, 2)-modal asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) iff A is a basic asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u)
and for any {i, j} =∈ {1, 2}, any a ∈ Ui, b, d ∈ Uj , the conditions (box-1), (diam-2(1)) and (diam-2(2)) are 
satisfied.
In what follows, we will identify invariance w.r.t. an (i, 2)-modal asimulation (A, B) with invariance with 
respect to its left projection A.
It turns out that for arbitrary i, j ∈ {1, 2}, invariance w.r.t. (i, j)-modal asimulations can be used to 
characterize modal intuitionistic fragment of FOL described by their respective STij . More precisely, one 
can obtain the following theorems:
Theorem 3. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}. A formula ϕ(x) is equivalent to an (i, j)-standard x-translation of an intu-
itionistic formula iff ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal asimulations.
Theorem 4. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} A formula ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal k-asimulations iff there 
exists a modal intuitionistic formula I such that r(STij(I, x)) ≤ k and ϕ(x) equivalent to STij(I, x).
In addition to Theorem 4, one can derive the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}. A formula ϕ(x) is equivalent to an (i, j)-standard x-translation of a modal 
intuitionistic formula iff there exists a k ∈ N such that ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal 
k-asimulations.
The proofs of Theorem 4 and Corollary 2 for the case i = j = 2 are to be found in Section 5.1. The proof 
of Theorem 3 for the same case makes up the content of Section 5.2. In Section 6 we show how to modify 
this proof for the other three cases at hand.
We devote the rest of this section to the analysis of some examples of modal asimulations.
Example 2. Consider Σ-models M1, M2 with U1 = {w1, w2, w3, w4}, U2 = {v1, v2}, ι1(P ) = {w3}, ι2(P ) =
{v2}. We further set that ι1(R), ι2(R) are reflexive and transitive closures of relations {(w1, w2)} and ∅, 
respectively. We assume that
ι1(R) := {(w1, w4), (w2, w3)},
and that
ι2(R) := {(v1, v2)}.
Finally, we set R and all the other unary predicate constants in Σ to ∅ in both models. Then the following 
couple (A, B) of binary relations is an (i, 2)-modal asimulation from (M1, w1) to (M2, v1) for any i ∈ {1, 2}:
A := {(w1, v1), (w2, v1), (v1, w2), (v2, w3), (w3, v2)},
B := {(w2, v1), (v1, w2), (w3, v2), (v2, w3)}.
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See Fig. 2. Note that this example shows that formula ¬∃y(R(x, y) ∧ P (y)) is not preserved under 
(i, 2)-modal simulations. Therefore, by Theorem 3 above, this formula is not definable by any (i, 2)-standard 
translation of a modal intuitionistic formula.8
Example 3. Consider the following modification of Example 1: we convert the R-link (w1, w3) into an R-link 
and add binary relation B = {(w1, v2), (v2, w1), (w2, v2), (v2, w2)}. Then the pair (A, B) turns out to be an 
(i, 2)-modal asimulation from (M1, w1) to (M2, v1) for any i ∈ {1, 2}.
By Theorem 3, this shows that the negation of the correspondence formula from Example 2, i.e. the 
formula ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ P (y)), is also undefinable by an (i, 2)-standard translation of a modal intuitionistic 
formula. Note that this undefinability does not follow already from Example 2, since modal intuitionistic 
logic is not closed w.r.t. classical negation.
Example 4. Consider Σ-models M1, M2 with U1 = {w0, w1, w2, w′}, U2 = {v0, v1, v2}, ι1(P ) = {w2, w′}, 
ι2(P ) = {v2}, ι1(P2) = {w2, w′2}, ι2(P2) = {v2, v′2}. We further set that ι1(R), ι2(R) are reflexive 
and transitive closures of relations {(w1, w2)} and {(v1, v2)}, respectively. We assume that ι1(R) =
{(w0, w1), (w0, w′)} and that ι2(R) = {(v0, v1)}. Finally, we set R and all the other unary predicate 
constants in Σ to ∅ in both models. Then the following binary relation A (see Fig. 3) is a (2, 1)-modal 
asimulation from (M1, w0) to (M2, v0):
A := {(wi, vi), (vi, wi) | i ∈ {0, 1, 2}} ∪ {(v1, w′), (v2, w′), (w′, v2)}.
This example displays the phenomenon already mentioned in the previous section: when dealing with the 
extensions of intuitionistic propositional logic, the asymmetric links between the states of Kripke models can 
be induced by symmetric links. Note that in this case one cannot construct the required asimulation without 
the asymmetric link v1 A w′. Indeed, this link is necessarily generated from symmetric A-link v0
↔
A w0 by 
condition (box-2) and the fact that w0 R1 w0 R1 w′. One has to choose here v1 as the counterpart for w′
since v1 is the only (R ◦R)-successor of v0. Moreover, turning v1 A w′ into a symmetric link immediately 
results in a violation of (base) by the evaluation of P in M1. Finally, note that the reducts of the two 
models in this examples are intended models of intuitionistic propositional logic.
8 Note that the relationship B ⊆ A is specific for this example and does not always obtain w.r.t. other cases of (i, 2)-modal 
asimulations. We omit a more detailed discussion of this for spatial reasons.
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5. Characterization of modal intuitionistic formulas: the main case
Theorems 4 and 3 allow for four different instantiations of i and j. The most difficult ones seem to be 
the two instantiations with j = 2, since with them the situation bears the smallest degree of analogy to the 
asimulation clauses considered earlier in [10] and [11]. Therefore, in the present section we consider in some 
detail the case i = j = 2, whereas in the next section we show how to adapt our proofs to the other cases.
In formulating our lemmas and presenting our proofs we will follow the method of [10] and [11]. This 
proof procedure itself is ultimately an adaptation of the standard way of proving the van Benthem modal 
characterization theorem to the peculiar conditions of intuitionistic logic and its extensions. Almost all of 
the new ideas needed to accommodate this procedure to modal intuitionistic logic are presented in the 
proofs of the three propositions below. The other parts of the proofs are basically just reiteration of the 
respective parts of the proofs in [10] and [11] which we could not omit without affecting the intelligibility 
of the whole narrative.
5.1. Proof of Theorem 4
Proposition 1. Let ϕ(x) = ST22(I, x) for some modal intuitionistic formula I, and let r(ϕ) = k. Let Σϕ ⊆ Θ, 
let (M1, t), (M2, u) be two pointed Θ-models, and let (A, B) be a (2, 2)-modal l-asimulation from (M1, t) to 
(M2, u). Then
((ām, a) A (b̄m, b) ∧m + k ≤ l ∧ a |=i ϕ(x)) ⇒ b |=j ϕ(x),
for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, (ām, a) ∈ Um+1i , and (b̄m, b) ∈ Um+1j .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of I. In what follows we will abbreviate the induction 
hypothesis by IH.
First, we note that since (A, B) is a (2, 2)-modal l-asimulation, then A is a basic l-asimulation. Therefore, 
the case when ϕ(x) is just P (x), for a P ∈ Θ, is handled by condition (p-base), and the cases related to ⊥, 
, ∧, and ∨, are trivial.
There remain the three cases which involve implication and modal operators:
Case 1. Let I = J → K. Then
ϕ(x) = ∀y(R(x, y) → (ST22(J, y) → ST22(K, y))).
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a |=i ∀y(R(x, y) → (ST22(J, y) → ST22(K, y))) (1)
(ām, a) A (b̄m, b) (2)
m + r(ϕ(x)) ≤ l (3)
Moreover, it follows from the definition of r that:
r(ϕ(x)) ≥ 1 (4)
r(ST22(J, y)) ≤ r(ϕ(x)) − 1 (5)
r(ST22(K, y)) ≤ r(ϕ(x)) − 1 (6)
Now, consider an arbitrary d ∈ Uj such that b Rj d. Since (3) and (4) clearly imply that m < l, it follows 
from (2) and (p-step) that one can choose a c ∈ Ui, such that:
a Ri c (7)
(b̄m, b, d) A (ām, a, c) (8)
(ām, a, c) A (b̄m, b, d) (9)
So, we reason as follows:
d |=j ST22(J, y) (premise) (10)
m + 1 + r(ST22(J, y)) ≤ l (from (3) and (5)) (11)
m + 1 + r(ST22(K, y)) ≤ l (from (3) and (6)) (12)
c |=i ST22(J, y) (from (8), (10), (11) by IH) (13)
c |=i ST22(K, y) (from (1), (7), and (13)) (14)
d |=j ST22(K, y) (from (9), (14), (12) by IH) (15)
Since d was chosen to be an arbitrary Rj-successor of b, this means that
b |=j ∀y(R(x, y) → (ST22(J, y) → ST22(K, y))),
and we are done.
Case 2. Let I = J . Then
ϕ(x) = ∀y(R(x, y) → ∀z(R(y, z) → ST22(J, z))).
Assume that:
a |=i ∀y(R(x, y) → ∀z(R(y, z) → ST22(J, z))) (16)
(ām, a) A (b̄m, b) (17)
m + r(ϕ(x)) ≤ l (18)
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r(ϕ(x)) ≥ 2 (19)
r(ST22(J, z)) ≤ r(ϕ(x)) − 2 (20)
Now, consider arbitrary d, f ∈ Uj such that b Rj d and d Rj f . Since (18) and (19) clearly imply that 
m + 1 < l, it follows from (17) and (p-box-2) that one can choose c, e ∈ Ui, such that:
a Ri c (21)
c Ri e (22)
(ām, a, c, e) A (b̄m, b, d, f) (23)
So, we reason as follows:
e |=i ST22(J, z) (from (16), (21), and (22)) (24)
m + 2 + r(ST22(J, z)) ≤ l (from (18) and (20)) (25)
f |=j ST22(J, z) (from (23), (24), (25) by IH) (26)
Since d was chosen to be an arbitrary Rj-successor of b, and f an arbitrary Rj-successor of d, this means 
that
b |=j ∀y(R(x, y) → ∀z(R(y, z) → ST22(J, z))),
and we are done.
Case 3. Let I = J . Then
ϕ(x) = ∀y(R(x, y) → ∃z(R(y, z) ∧ ST22(J, z))).
Assume that:
a |=i ∀y(R(x, y) → ∃z(R(y, z) ∧ ST22(J, z))) (27)
(ām, a) A (b̄m, b) (28)
m + r(ϕ(x)) ≤ l (29)
Moreover, it follows from the definition of r that:
r(ϕ(x)) ≥ 2 (30)
r(ST(J, y)) ≤ r(ϕ(x)) − 2 (31)
Since (29) and (30) clearly imply that m +1 < l, it follows from (28) and (p-diam-2(1)) that one can choose 
a c ∈ Ui, such that:
a Ri c (32)
(ām, a, c) B (b̄m, b, d) (33)
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c Ri e (34)
e |=i ST22(J, z) (35)
Also, by (33), condition (p-diam-2(2)), and the fact that m + 1 < l, we have:
∃f ∈ Uj(d Rj f ∧ (ām, a, c, e) A (b̄m, b, d, f)) (36)
We further get that:
m + 2 + r(ST22(J, z)) ≤ l (from (29) and (31)) (37)
∃f ∈ Uj(d Rj f ∧ (f |=j ST22(J, z))) (by IH from (35), (36), and (37)) (38)
Since d was chosen to be an arbitrary Rj-successor of b, this means that
b |=j ∀y(R(x, y) → ∃z(R(y, z) ∧ ST22(J, z))),
and we are done. 
We use Proposition 1 to derive the ‘easy’ direction of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 4:
Corollary 3. Suppose ϕ(x) is equivalent to ST22(I, x) for some modal intuitionistic formula I with 
r(ST22(I, x)) ≤ k. Then ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal k-asimulations.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be logically equivalent to ST22(I, x) for some modal intuitionistic formula I, and let 
r(ST22(I, x)) = s. Then it follows from Proposition 1 (setting i := 1, j := 2, m := 0, and l := s) that 
ST22(I, x) is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal s-asimulations, and so is ϕ(x).
Therefore, in the assumptions of the Corollary, if r(ST22(I, x)) = s, then ϕ(x) is invariant with respect 
to (2, 2)-modal s-asimulations, and this holds for any natural s. This already yields us the Corollary for the 
case r(ST22(I, x)) = k.
Assume that r(ST22(I, x)) = l < k. Then, by the above reasoning, ϕ(x) is invariant with respect to 
(2, 2)-modal l-asimulations. It remains to note that if l < k, then all (2, 2)-modal k-asimulations are, by 
definition, (2, 2)-modal l-asimulations. Therefore, ϕ(x) must be invariant w.r.t. (2, 2)-modal k-asimulations 
as well. 
On our way to the inverse direction of the (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 4 we first need a new piece 
of notation. For a formula ϕ(x) in the correspondence language, variable x and a natural l, we denote 
with int(ϕ, x, l) the set of all (2, 2)-standard x-translations of intuitionistic formulas, which happen to be 
(Σϕ, x, l)-formulas. We use this notation to define three types of formulas which are important components 
in the proofs to follow. Let Σϕ ⊆ Θ, let M be a Θ-model and let a ∈ U . Then:
tpl(ϕ(x),M, a) = {ψ(x) ∈ int(ϕ, x, l) | M,a |= ψ(x)},




{tpl(ϕ(x),M, b) | ι(R)(a, b)}.
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mentioned assumptions about ϕ(x), l, Θ, M , a, and for arbitrary Θ-model M ′ and a′ ∈ U ′ we have:
tpl(ϕ(x),M, a) ⊆ tpl(ϕ(x),M ′, a′) ⇔ tpl(ϕ(x),M ′, a′) ⊆ tpl(ϕ(x),M, a).
We then invoke the following well known fact about classical first-order logic:
Lemma 1. For any finite predicate vocabulary Θ, any variable x and any natural k there are, up to logical 
equivalence, only finitely many (Θ, x, k)-formulas.
For a proof of this fact see, e.g. Lemma XII.3.4 in [7, p. 253]. It implies that for every set of formulas 
which have one of the forms int(ϕ, x, l), tpl(ϕ(x), M, a), tpl(ϕ(x), M, a), impl(ϕ(x), M, a), there exists a 
finite subset collecting the logical equivalents for all the formulas in the set. Moreover, it allows us to collect 
logical equivalents of all (2, 2)-standard translations of intuitionistic formulas which are true together with 
a given formula at some pointed model in a single formula which we will call a complete conjunction:
Definition 12. Let ϕ(x) be a formula. A conjunction Ψ(x) of formulas from int(ϕ, x, k) is called a com-
plete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction iff there is a pointed model (M, a) such that M, a |= Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x), and for any
ψ(x) ∈ tpk(ϕ(x), M, a) we have Ψ(x) |= ψ(x).
The two following lemmas summarize some rather obvious properties of complete conjunctions:
Lemma 2. For any formula ϕ(x), any natural k ≥ 1, any Θ such that Σϕ ⊆ Θ and any pointed Θ-model 
(M, a) such that M, a |= ϕ(x) there is a complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction Ψ(x) such that M, a |= Ψ(x) ∧ϕ(x).
Proof. Consider tpk(ϕ(x), M, a). This set is non-empty since ST22(, x) will be true at (M, a). Due to 
Lemma 1, we can choose in this set a non-empty finite subset Γ(x) such that any formula from tpk(ϕ(x), M, a)
is logically equivalent to (and hence follows from) a formula in Γ(x). By Γ(x) ⊆ tpk(ϕ(x), M, a), we also 




Γ(x) is a complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction. 
Lemma 3. For any formula ϕ(x) and any natural k there are, up to logical equivalence, only finitely many 
complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunctions.
Proof. It suffices to observe that for any formula ϕ(x) and any natural k, a complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction 
is a (Σϕ, x, k)-formula. Our lemma then follows from Lemma 1. 
As a result, we are now able to establish the ‘hard’ right-to-left direction of Theorem 4:
Proposition 2. Let ϕ(x) be invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal k-asimulations. Then ϕ(x) is equivalent to 
a (2, 2)-standard x-translation of a modal intuitionistic formula I, such that r(ST22(I, x)) ≤ k.
Proof. We may assume that ϕ(x) is satisfiable, since ⊥ is obviously invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal 
k-asimulations and we have, for example, ⊥ ↔ ST22(⊥, x).
We now have to consider two cases.
Case 1. There is no complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction Ψ(x) such that Ψ(x) ∧¬ϕ(x) is satisfiable. Then take 
the set of all complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunctions. This set is non-empty, because ϕ(x) is satisfiable, and by 
Lemma 2, it can be satisfied only together with some complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction. Now, using Lemma 3, 
choose in it a finite non-empty subset { Ψi1(x) . . . , Ψin(x) } such that any complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction is 
equivalent to an element of this subset. We can show that ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to Ψi1(x) ∨. . .∨Ψin(x). 
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therefore, its equivalent in { Ψi1(x) . . . , Ψin(x) } is also true at (M, a), and so, finally we have
M,a |= Ψi1(x) ∨ . . . ∨ Ψin(x).
In the other direction, if M, a |= Ψi1(x) ∨ . . . ∨ Ψin(x), then for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n we have M, a |= Ψij (x). 
Then, since Ψij (x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x) is, according to our assumption, unsatisfiable, we must also have M, a |=
ϕ(x). So ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to Ψi1(x) ∨ . . . , ∨Ψin(x) but the latter formula, being a disjunction of 
conjunctions of (2, 2)-standard x-translations of modal intuitionistic formulas of degree not exceeding k, is 
itself a (2, 2)-standard x-translation of a modal intuitionistic formula of degree not exceeding k, and so we 
are done.
Case 2. There exists a complete (ϕ, x, k)-conjunction Ψ(x) such that Ψ(x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x) is satisfiable, so that 
for some pointed model (M2, u) we get
u |=2 Ψ(x) ∧ ¬ϕ(x).
We infer a contradiction thus showing that this case is impossible.
By Definition 12, we can choose a pointed Σϕ-model (M1, t) such that t |=1 Ψ(x) ∧ ϕ(x), and that any 
formula ψ(x) ∈ tpk(ϕ(x), M1, t) follows from Ψ(x). We then construct a (2, 2)-modal k-asimulation from 
(M1, t) to (M2, u) and thus obtain a contradiction, since by the choice of (M1, t) and (M2, u) we know 
that ϕ will not be preserved along this asimulation, contrary to our assumption that ϕ is (2, 2)-modal 
k-asimulation-invariant.
We define this asimulation as the ordered couple (A, B), where for arbitrary i, j ∈ { 1, 2 } and (ām, a) ∈
Um+1i , (b̄m, b) ∈ Um+1j we set:
(ām, a) A (b̄m, b) ⇔ (m ≤ k ∧ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, a) ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , b)),
and, for B:
(ām, a) B (b̄m, b) ⇔ (m ≤ k ∧ impk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , b) ⊆ impk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, a)).
From the definition of (A, B) it is evident that conditions (p-type) and (p-B-type) are satisfied. As for 
condition (elem), note that since every formula in tpk(ϕ(x), M1, t) follows from Ψ(x), and since (M2, u)
verifies Ψ(x), we must have that
tpk(ϕ(x),M1, t) ⊆ tpk(ϕ(x),M2, u),
which, in turn, means that we will have t A u.
To verify condition (p-base), note that the degree of standard translation of any atomic formula is 0, and 
the above condition implies that k −m ≥ 0. Therefore, it is evident that for any (ām, a) A (b̄m, b) and any 
unary predicate letter P ∈ Σϕ we will have a |=i P (x) ⇒ b |=j P (x).
To verify condition (p-step), take any (ām, a) A (b̄m, b) such that m < k and any d ∈ Uj such that b Rj d. 
In this case we will also have m + 1 ≤ k.
Then consider the sets tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mj , d) and tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mj , d). These sets are non-empty, since 
by our assumption we have k −m − 1 ≥ 0. Therefore, as we have r(ST(⊥, x)) = r(ST(, x)) = 0, we will 
also have ST(⊥, x) ∈ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mj , d) and ST(, x) ∈ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mj , d). Then, according to our 
Lemma 1, there are finite non-empty sets of logical equivalents for both sets. Choosing these finite sets, we 
in fact choose some finite subsets
G.K. Olkhovikov / Journal of Applied Logic 21 (2017) 57–90 75{ ST(I1, x) . . .ST(In, x) } ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d),
and
{ ST(J1, x) . . .ST(Jq, x) } ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d)
such that
(∀ψ(x) ∈ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d))(ST(I1, x) ∧ . . . ∧ ST(In, x) |= ψ(x));
(∀χ(x) ∈ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d))(χ(x) |= ST(J1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST(Jq, x)).
But then we obtain that
b |=j ST((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ In) → (J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
In fact, d falsifies this implication for (Mj , b). But every formula in both sets
{ ST(I1, x) . . .ST(In, x) }, { ST(J1, x) . . .ST(Jq, x) }
is, by their choice, a (Σϕ, x, k − m − 1)-formula, and so the standard translation of implication under 
consideration must be a (Σϕ, x, k −m)-formula. Note, further, that by (ām, a) A (b̄m, b) we have
tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, a) ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , b)
and therefore this implication must be false at (Mi, a) as well. But then take any c ∈ Ui such that a Ri c
and c verifies the conjunction in the antecedent of the formula but falsifies its consequent. We must conclude 
then, by the choice of { ST(I1, x) . . .ST(In, x) }, that c |=i tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mj , d) and so, by the definition 
of A, and given that m + 1 ≤ k, that
(b̄m, b, d) A (ām, a, c).
Since, in addition, c falsifies every formula from { ST(J1, x) . . .ST(Jq, x) }, then, by the choice of this set, 
we must conclude that:
tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d) ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, c)
whence, by contraposition we get that:
tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, c) ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d).
But then, again by the definition of A, and the fact that m +1 ≤ k, we must also have (ām, a, c) A (b̄m, b, d), 
and so condition (p-step) holds.
To verify condition (p-box-2), take any (ām, a) A (b̄m, b) such that m +1 < k and any d, f ∈ Uj such that 
b Rj d and d Rj f . In this case we will also have m + 2 ≤ k. Then consider tpk−m−2(ϕ(x), Mj , f). This set 
is non-empty, since by our assumption we have k − m − 2 ≥ 0. Therefore, as we have r(ST22(⊥, x)) = 0, 
we will also have ST22(⊥, x) ∈ tpk−m−2(ϕ(x), Mj , f). Then, according to our Lemma 1, there exists a finite 
non-empty set of logical equivalents for tpk−m−2(ϕ(x), Mj , f). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose 
some finite { ST22(J1, x) . . .ST22(Jq, x) } ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x), Mj , f) such that
(∀ψ(x) ∈ tpk−m−2(ϕ(x),Mj , f))(ψ(x) |= ST22(J1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST22(Jq, x)).
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b |=j ST22((J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
In fact, d, f jointly falsify this boxed disjunction for (Mj , b). But, given that
{ ST22(J1, x) . . .ST22(Jq, x) } ⊆ tpk−m−2(ϕ(x),Mj , f),
the standard translation of the boxed disjunction under consideration must be in tpk−m(ϕ, Mj , b). Note, 
further, that by (ām, a) A (b̄m, b) we have
tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, a) ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , b),
thus:
tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , b) ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, a),
and therefore this boxed disjunction must be false at (Mi, a) as well. But then take any c, e ∈ Ui
such that a Ri c, c Ri e and c, e falsify the boxed disjunction under consideration. By choice of 
{ ST(J1, x) . . .ST(Jq, x) } it follows that
tpk−m−2(ϕ(x),Mj , f) ⊆ tpk−m−2(ϕ(x),Mi, e),
and thus
tpk−m−2(ϕ(x),Mi, e) ⊆ tpk−m−2(ϕ(x),Mj , f).
But then, again by the definition of A, and given the fact that m + 2 ≤ k, we must also have (ām, a, c, e) A
(b̄m, b, d, f), and so condition (p-box-2) holds.
To verify condition (p-diam-2(1)), take any (ām, a) A (b̄m, b) such that m + 1 < k and any d ∈ Uj such 
that b Rj d. In this case we will also have m + 2 ≤ k. Then consider impk−m−2(ϕ(x), Mj , d). This set is 
non-empty, since by our assumption we have k −m − 2 ≥ 0. Therefore, as we have r(ST22(⊥, x)) = 0, we 
will also have ST22(⊥, x) ∈ impk−m−2(ϕ(x), Mj , d). Then, according to our Lemma 1, there exists a finite 
non-empty set of logical equivalents for impk−m−2(ϕ(x), Mj , d). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose 
some finite
{ ST22(J1, x) . . .ST22(Jq, x) } ⊆ impk−m−2(ϕ(x),Mj , d)
such that
(∀ψ(x) ∈ impk−m−2(ϕ(x),Mj , d))(ψ(x) |= ST22(J1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST22(Jq, x)).
But then we obtain that
b |=j ST22((J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
In fact, d falsifies this disjunction for (Mj , b). But, given that
{ ST22(J1, x) . . .ST22(Jq, x) } ⊆ impk−m−2(ϕ(x),Mj , d),
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Note, further, that by (ām, a) A (b̄m, b) we have
tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, a) ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , b),
thus:
tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , b) ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, a),
and therefore the modalized disjunction must be false at (Mi, a) as well. But then take any c ∈ Ui such that 
a Ri c, and for every e, such that c Ri e, we have
e |=j ST22(J1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST22(Jq, x).
By choice of { ST22(J1, x) . . .ST22(Jq, x) } it follows that
impk−m−2(ϕ(x),Mj , d) ⊆ impk−m−2(ϕ(x),Mi, c).
But then, again by the definition of B, and given the fact that m + 2 ≤ k, we must also have (ām, a, c) B
(b̄m, b, d), and so condition (p-diam-2(1)) holds.
Finally, to verify condition (p-diam-2(2)), take any (ām, a) B (b̄m, b) such that m < k and any c ∈ Ui
such that a Ri c. In this case we will also have m + 1 ≤ k. Then consider tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mi, c). This set 
is non-empty, since by our assumption we have k − m − 1 ≥ 0. Therefore, as we have r(ST22(, x)) = 0, 
we will also have ST22(, x) ∈ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mi, c). Then, according to our Lemma 1, there exists a finite 
non-empty set of logical equivalents for tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mi, c). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose 
some finite { ST22(I1, x) . . .ST22(Ip, x) } ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mi, c) such that
(∀ψ(x) ∈ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, c))(ST22(I1, x) ∧ . . . ∧ ST22(Ip, x) |= ψ(x)).
But then we obtain that
ST22((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x) /∈ impk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, a).
Note, further, that by (ām, a) B (b̄m, b) we have
impk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , b) ⊆ impk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, a),
thus:
ST22((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x) /∈ impk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , b).
But then take any d ∈ Uj such that b Rj d and we have
d |=j ST22(I1, x) ∧ . . . ∧ ST22(Ip, x).
By choice of { ST22(I1, x) . . .ST22(Ip, x) } it follows that
tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, c) ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d).
But then, again by the definition of A, and given the fact that m + 1 ≤ k, we must also have (ām, a, c) A
(b̄m, b, d), and so condition (p-diam-2(2)) holds.
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in place. 
Theorem 4 now immediately follows from Corollary 3 and Proposition 2. It remains to supply a proof for 
Corollary 2.
This proof is as follows:
If ϕ(x) is equivalent to a (2, 2)-standard x-translation of a modal intuitionistic formula I, then let 
r(ST22(I, x)) = k. By Theorem 4 we get then that ϕ(x) is invariant w.r.t. basic k-asimulations.
In the other direction, if ϕ(x) is invariant w.r.t. basic k-asimulations, then, by Theorem 4, there must be 
a modal intuitionistic formula I such that ϕ(x) is logically equivalent to r(ST22(I, x)).
5.2. Proof of Theorem 3
We now turn to the proof of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 3. The ‘only if’ direction we again have by 
Corollary 3:
Corollary 4. If ϕ(x) is equivalent to a (2, 2)-standard x-translation of an intuitionistic formula, then ϕ(x)
is invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal asimulations.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be logically equivalent to ST22(I, x) for some intuitionistic formula I. For an arbitrary 
Θ ⊇ Σϕ, Θ-models M1 and M2, and arbitrary t ∈ U1, u ∈ U2 let (A, B) be a (2, 2)-modal asimulation from 
(M1, t) to (M2, u), so that we have t A u. Assume that
t |=1 ϕ(x).
Then consider the ordered couple (A′, B′) such that:
A′ = { 〈(ām, a), (b̄m, b; )〉 |
| ∃i, j({ i, j } = { 1, 2 } ∧ (ām, a) ∈ Um+1i ∧ (b̄m, b) ∈ Um+1j ∧ a A b) };
B′ = { 〈(ām, a), (b̄m, b; )〉 |
| ∃i, j({ i, j } = { 1, 2 } ∧ (ām, a) ∈ Um+1i ∧ (b̄m, b) ∈ Um+1j ∧ a B b) }.
It is straightforward to verify that (A′, B′) is a (2, 2)-modal k-asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) for every 
k ∈ N. Moreover, we still have t A′ u. By Corollary 3, there is a natural k, such that ϕ(x) is invariant with 
respect to (2, 2)-modal k-asimulation, therefore we have
u |=2 ϕ(x).
Since the (2, 2)-modal asimulation (A, B) was chosen arbitrarily, this means that ϕ(x) is invariant with 
respect to (2, 2)-modal asimulations. 
Note that the proof of the above corollary shows that every (2, 2)-modal asimulation induces a couple of 
binary relations which turns out to be a (2, 2)-modal k-asimulation for every natural k. In other words, the 
following lemma holds:
Lemma 4. If (A, B) is a (2, 2)-modal asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u), then the couple (A′, B′), defined 
as in the proof of Corollary 4, is a (2, 2)-modal k-asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u) for every k ∈ N.
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(2, 2)-modal k-asimulation for every natural k, then one can define a (2, 2)-modal asimulation (A′′, B′′)
stipulating that a A′′ b iff there exist ām, b̄m, such that (ām, a) A (b̄m, b), and similarly for B′′.
To proceed, we need to introduce some further notions and results from classical model theory. For a 
model M and ān ∈ U let [M, ̄an] be the extension of M with ān as new individual constants interpreted 
as themselves. It is easy to see that there is a simple relation between the truth of a formula at a sequence 
of elements of a Θ-model and the truth of its substitution instance in an extension of the above-mentioned 
kind; namely, for any Θ-model M , any Θ-formula ϕ(ȳn, w̄m) and any ān, ̄bm ∈ U it is true that:
[M, ān], b̄m |= ϕ(ān, w̄m) ⇔ M, ān, b̄m |= ϕ(ȳn, w̄m).
We will call a theory of M (and write Th(M)) the set of all first-order sentences true at M . We will call 
an n-type of M a set of formulas Γ(w̄n) consistent with Th(M).
Definition 13. Let M be a Θ-model. M is ω-saturated iff for all k ∈ N and for all ān ∈ U , every k-type 
Γ(w̄k) of [M, ̄an] is satisfiable in [M, ̄an].
Definition of ω-saturation normally requires satisfiability of 1-types only. However, our modification is 
equivalent to the more familiar version: see e.g. [6, Lemma 4.31, p. 73].
It is known that every model can be elementarily extended to an ω-saturated model; in other words, the 
following lemma holds:
Lemma 5. Let M be a Θ-model. Then there is an ω-saturated extension M ′ of M such that for all ān ∈ U
and every Θ-formula ϕ(w̄n):
M, ān |= ϕ(w̄n) ⇔ M ′, ān |= ϕ(w̄n).
The latter lemma is a trivial corollary of e.g. [5, Lemma 5.1.14, p. 216].
A very useful property of ω-saturated models is that one can define among them (2, 2)-modal asimulations 
more or less according to the strategy assumed in the proof of Proposition 2. In order to do this, however, 
we need to re-define the types used in the above proof. We collect the required changes in the following 
definition:
Definition 14. Let M be a Θ-model, t ∈ U and let x be a variable in the correspondence language. Then we 
define intx(Θ) to be the set of all Θ-formulas that are (2, 2)-standard x-translations of modal intuitionistic 
formulas. We further set:
tpx(M, t) = {ψ(x) ∈ intx(Θ) | M, t |= ψ(x)};
tpx(M, t) = {ψ(x) ∈ intx(Θ) | M, t |= ψ(x)};
impx(M, t) =
⋂
{tpx(M,u) | ι(R)(t, u)}.
The analogue of ‘contrapositive’ scheme mentioned above holds, namely, for arbitrary models M , M ′, 
and elements a ∈ U , and a′ ∈ U ′ we have:
tpx(M,a) ⊆ tpx(M ′, a′) ⇔ tpx(M ′, a′) ⊆ tpx(M,a).
The following proposition gives the precise version of the above statement:
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tpx(M2, u) for some variable x in the correspondence language. Then the ordered couple (A, B) such that:
A = { 〈a, b〉 | ∃i, j({ i, j } = { 1, 2 } ∧ tpx(Mi, a) ⊆ tpx(Mj , b)) }
and:
B = { 〈a, b〉 | ∃i, j({ i, j } = { 1, 2 } ∧ impx(Mi, a) ⊇ impx(Mj , b)) }
is a (2, 2)-modal asimulation from (M1, t) to (M2, u).
Proof. It is obvious that t A u, and that conditions (type) and (B-type) are satisfied as well. Since for any 
unary predicate letter P and variable x formula P (x) is a standard x-translation of an atomic intuitionistic 
formula, condition (base) is trivially satisfied for A.
To verify condition (step), choose any i, j such that {i, j} = { 1, 2 }, and a ∈ Ui, b, d ∈ Uj such that a A b, 
that is to say, tpx(Mi, a) ⊆ tpx(Mj , b) and b Rj d. Now consider tpx(Mj , d) and tpx(Mj , d) and choose an 
arbitrary finite subset for each of these types, so that we have:
{ ST22(I1, x) . . .ST22(Ip, x) } ⊆ tpx(Mj , d),
{ ST22(J1, x) . . .ST22(Jq, x) } ⊆ tpx(Mj , d).
We immediately get that:
b |=j ST22((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip) → (J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
Since by contraposition of a A b we have that tpx(Mj , b) ⊆ tpx(Mi, a), we obtain that:
a |=i ST22((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip) → (J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
This means that every finite subset of the type
{R(a, x) } ∪ tpx(Mj , d) ∪ {¬ψ(x) | ψ(x) ∈ tpx(Mj , d)}
is satisfiable at [Mi, a]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is consistent with Th([Mi, a])
and, by ω-saturation of both M1 and M2, it must be satisfied in [Mi, a] by some c ∈ Ui. So for any such c
we will have a Ri c and, moreover,
tpx(Mj , d) = tpx(Mi, c),
whence we get that c 
↔
A d and that condition (step) is verified.
To verify condition (box-2), choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ Ui, b ∈ Uj such that a A b, 
that is to say, tpx(Mi, a) ⊆ tpx(Mj , b) and choose any d, f ∈ Uj for which we have b Rj d and d Rj f .
Consider tpx(Mj , f). If { ST22(J1, x) . . .ST22(Jq, x) } is a finite subset of this type, then we have
b |=j ST22((J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
Since by contraposition of a A b we have that tpx(Mj , b) ⊆ tpx(Mi, a), we obtain that
a |=i ST22((J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
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{R(a, y), R(y, x) } ∪ {¬ψ(x) | ψ(x) ∈ tpx(Mj , f)}
is satisfiable at [Mi, a]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is consistent with Th([Mi, a])
and, by ω-saturation of both M1 and M2, it must be satisfied in [Mi, a] by some c, e ∈ Ui. So for any such 
c and e we will have a Ri c, c Ri e and, moreover,
(∀ψ ∈ tpx(Mj , f))(e |=i ψ(x)).
Thus we have that tpx(Mj , f) ⊆ tpx(Mi, e), and further, by contraposition, that tpx(Mi, e) ⊆ tpx(Mj , f). 
Thus we get that e A f and condition (box-2) is verified.
To verify condition (diam-2(1)), choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ Ui, b ∈ Uj such that 
a A b, that is to say, tpx(Mi, a) ⊆ tpx(Mj , b) and choose any d ∈ Uj for which we have b Rj d.
Consider impx(Mj , d). If { ST22(J1, x) . . .ST22(Jq, x) } is a finite subset of this type, then we have
b |=j ST22((J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
Since by contraposition of a A b we have that tpx(Mj , b) ⊆ tpx(Mi, a), we obtain that
a |=i ST22((J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
This means that every finite subset of the type
{R(a, x) } ∪ {∀y(R(x, y) → ¬ψ(y)) | ψ(x) ∈ impx(Mj , d)}
is satisfiable at [Mi, a]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is consistent with Th([Mi, a])
and, by ω-saturation of both M1 and M2, it must be satisfied in [Mi, a] by some c ∈ Ui. So for any such c
we will have a Ri c and, moreover,
(∀ψ(x) ∈ impx(Mj , d))(∀e ∈ Ui)(Ri(c, e) ⇒ e |=i ψ(x)).
Thus we have that impx(Mj , d) ⊆ impx(Mi, c), and therefore, that c B d. Thus condition (diam-2(1)) is 
verified.
Finally, to verify condition (diam-2(2)), choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ Ui, b ∈ Uj
such that a B b, that is to say, impx(Mj , b) ⊆ impx(Mi, a) and choose any c ∈ Ui for which we have a Ri c.
Consider tpx(Mi, c). If { ST22(I1, x) . . .ST22(Ip, x) } is a finite subset of this type, then we have
c |=i ST22((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x).
Therefore, the set { ST22(I1, x) . . .ST22(Ip, x) } is disjoint from impx(Mi, a), and thus it is also disjoint from 
impx(Mj , b). Therefore, the formula ST22(I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip, x) is also verified by some Rj-successor of b. More 
formally, this means that every finite subset of the type
{R(b, x) } ∪ {ψ(x) | ψ(x) ∈ tpx(Mi, c)}
is satisfiable at [Mj , b]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is consistent with Th([Mj , b])
and, by ω-saturation of both M1 and M2, it must be satisfied in [Mj , b] by some d ∈ Uj . So for any such d
we will have b Rj d and, moreover,
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Thus we have that tpx(Mi, c) ⊆ tpx(Mj , c), and therefore, that c A d. The condition (diam-2(2)) is veri-
fied. 
We are prepared now to prove the hard part of (2, 2)-instantiation of Theorem 3:
Lemma 6. Let ϕ(x) be invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal asimulations. Then ϕ(x) is equivalent to 
(2, 2)-standard translation of a modal intuitionistic formula.
Proof. We may assume that ϕ(x) is satisfiable, for ⊥ is clearly invariant with respect to (2, 2)-modal 
asimulations and ⊥ ↔ ST22(⊥, x) is a valid formula. Throughout this proof, we will write ic(ϕ(x)) for the 
following set:
{ψ(x) ∈ intx(Σϕ) | ϕ(x) |= ψ(x)}
Our strategy will be to show that ic(ϕ(x)) |= ϕ(x). Once this is done, we will apply compactness of first-
order logic and conclude that ϕ(x) is equivalent to a finite conjunction of standard (2, 2)-modal x-translations 
of intuitionistic formulas and hence to a standard x-translation of the corresponding intuitionistic conjunc-
tion.
To show this, take any Σϕ-model M1 and a ∈ U1 such that a |=1 ic(ϕ(x)). Then, of course, we also 
have ic(ϕ(x)) ⊆ tpx(M1, a). Such a model exists, because ϕ(x) is satisfiable and ic(ϕ(x)) will be satisfied in 
any model satisfying ϕ(x). Then we can also choose a Σϕ-model M2 and b ∈ U2 such that b |=2 ϕ(x) and 
tpx(M2, b) ⊆ tpx(M1, a).
For suppose otherwise. Then for any Σϕ-model M such that U ⊆ N and any c ∈ U such that M, c |= ϕ(x)
we can choose a modal intuitionistic formula I(M,c) such that ST22(I(M,c), x) is in tpx(M, c) but not in 
tpx(M1, a). Then consider the set
S = {ϕ(x) } ∪ {¬ST22(I(M,c), x) | M, c |= ϕ(x) }.
Let { ϕ(x), ¬ST22(I1, x) . . . , ¬ST22(Iq, x) } be a finite subset of this set. If this set is unsatisfiable, then we 
must have ϕ(x) |= ST22(I1, x) ∨ . . .∨ST22(Iq, x), but then we will also have (ST22(I1, x) ∨ . . .∨ST22(Iq, x)) ∈
ic(ϕ(x)) ⊆ tpx(M1, a), and hence (ST22(I1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST22(Iq, x)) will be true at (M1, a). But then at least 
one of ST22(I1, x) . . .ST22(Iq, x) must also be true at (M1, a), which contradicts the choice of these formulas. 
Therefore, every finite subset of S is satisfiable, and, by compactness, S itself is satisfiable as well. But then, 
by the Löwenheim–Skolem property, we can take a Σϕ-model M ′ such that U ′ ⊆ N and g ∈ U ′ such that S
is true at (M ′, g) and this will be a model for which we will have both M ′, g |= ST22(I(M ′,g), x) by choice 
of I(M ′,g) and M ′, g |= ST22(I(M ′,g), x) by satisfaction of S, a contradiction.
Therefore, we will assume in the following that some Σϕ-model M2 and some b ∈ U2 are such that 
a |=1 ic(ϕ(x)), b |=2 ϕ(x), and tpx(M2, b) ⊆ tpx(M1, a). According to Lemma 5, there exist ω-saturated 
elementary extensions M ′, M ′′ of M1 and M2, respectively. We have:
M1, a |= ϕ(x) ⇔ M ′, a |= ϕ(x) (39)
M ′′, b |= ϕ(x) (40)
Also, since M1, M2 are elementarily equivalent to M ′, M ′′, respectively, we have
tpx(M ′′, b) = tpx(M2, b) ⊆ tpx(M1, a) = tpx(M ′, a).
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A = { 〈c, d〉 | ∃μ, μ′({μ, μ′ } = {M ′,M ′′ } ∧ tpx(μ, c) ⊆ tpx(μ′, d)) }
B = { 〈c, d〉 | ∃μ, μ′({μ, μ′ } = {M ′,M ′′ } ∧ impx(μ, c) ⊇ impx(μ′, d)) }
is a (2, 2)-modal asimulation from (M ′′, b) to (M ′, a). But then by (40) and invariance of ϕ(x) we get 
M ′, a |= ϕ(x), and further, by (39) we conclude that M1, a |= ϕ(x). Therefore, ϕ(x) in fact follows from 
ic(ϕ(x)). 
Theorem 3 now follows from Corollary 4 and Lemma 6.
6. Other cases
We now briefly show how to obtain the proofs for the other three instantiations of Theorems 4 and 3. The 
general scheme of the proofs in these cases is very similar to the proofs given in the previous section. The 
main difference is that in the other cases we need to assume different sets of conditions in the definitions of 
modal k-asimulations and modal asimulations simpliciter. This affects the three propositions of the previous 
section, namely, Propositions 1, 2, and 3, in that some parts of their proofs become irrelevant and some new 
parts need to be supplied instead. Accordingly, when treating the other three instantiations of our main 
results below, we mainly concentrate on how to revise the proofs of these propositions.
6.1. Case i = 1, j = 2
In order to obtain the proofs of Theorems 4 and 3 one needs to revise the proofs given in Section 5 in 
the following way:
Ad Proposition 1:
Revise the inductive step in case where I = J as follows:
In this case we have
ϕ(x) = ∀y(R(x, y) → ST12(J, y)).
Assume that:
a |=i ∀y(R(x, y) → ST12(J, y)) (41)
(ām, a) A (b̄m, b) (42)
m + r(ϕ(x)) ≤ l (43)
Moreover, it follows from the definition of r that:
r(ϕ(x)) ≥ 1 (44)
r(ST12(J, y)) ≤ r(ϕ(x)) − 1 (45)
Now, consider arbitrary d ∈ Uj such that b Rj d. Since (43) and (44) clearly imply that m < l, it follows 
from (42) and (p-box-1) that one can choose a c ∈ Ui, such that:
a Ri c (46)
(ām, a, c) A (b̄m, b, d) (47)
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c |=i ST12(J, y) (from (41) and (46)) (48)
m + 1 + r(ST12(J, y)) ≤ l (from (43) and (45)) (49)
d |=j ST12(J, y) (from (47), (48), (49) by IH) (50)
Since d was chosen to be an arbitrary Rj-successor of b, this means that
b |=j ∀y(R(x, y) → ST12(J, y)),
and we are done.
Ad Proposition 2:
Replace the verification of condition (p-box-2) with the following verification of condition (p-box-1):
Take any (ām, a) A (b̄m, b) such that m < k and any d ∈ Uj such that b Rj d. In this case 
we will also have m + 1 ≤ k. Then consider tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mj , d). This set is non-empty, since by 
our assumption we have k − m − 1 ≥ 0. Therefore, as we have r(ST12(⊥, x)) = 0, we will also have 
ST12(⊥, x) ∈ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mj , d). Then, according to Lemma 1, there exists a finite non-empty set 
of logical equivalents for tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mj , d). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose some finite 
{ ST12(J1, x) . . .ST12(Jq, x) } ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mj , d) such that
(∀ψ(x) ∈ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d))(ψ(x) |= ST12(J1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ ST12(Jq, x)).
But then we obtain that
b |=j ST12((J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
In fact, d falsifies this boxed disjunction for (Mj , b). But, given that
{ ST12(J1, x) . . .ST12(Jq, x) } ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d),
the standard translation of boxed disjunction under consideration must be in tpk−m(ϕ(x), Mj , b). Note, 
further, that by (ām, a) A (b̄m, b) we have
tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, a) ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , b),
thus:
tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , b) ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, a),
and therefore this boxed disjunction must be false at (Mi, a) as well. But then take any c ∈ Ui such that 
a Ri c and c falsifies the disjunction under consideration. By choice of { ST12(J1, x) . . .ST12(Jq, x) } it 
follows that
tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d) ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, c),
and thus
tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, c) ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d).
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(b̄m, b, d), and so condition (p-box-1) holds.
Ad Proposition 3:
Replace the verification of condition (box-2) with the following verification of condition (box-1):
Choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ Ui, b ∈ Uj such that a A b, that is to say, tpx(Mi, a) ⊆
tpx(Mj , b) and choose any d ∈ Uj for which we have b Rj d.
Consider tpx(Mj , d). If { ST12(J1, x) . . .ST12(Jq, x) } is a finite subset of this type, then we have
b |=j ST12((J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
Since by contraposition of a A b we have that tpx(Mj , b) ⊆ tpx(Mi, a), we obtain that
a |=i ST12((J1 ∨ . . . ∨ Jq), x).
This means that every finite subset of the type
{R(a, x) } ∪ {¬ψ(x) | ψ(x) ∈ tpx(Mj , d)}
is satisfiable at [Mi, a]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is consistent with Th([Mi, a])
and, by ω-saturation of both M1 and M2, it must be satisfied in [Mi, a] by some c ∈ Ui. So for any such c
we will have a Ri c and, moreover,
(∀ψ ∈ tpx(Mj , d))(c |=i ψ(x)).
Thus we have that tpx(Mj , d) ⊆ tpx(Mi, c), and further, by contraposition, that tpx(Mi, c) ⊆ tpx(Mj , d). 
Hence we get that c A d and condition (box-2) is verified.
6.2. Case i = 2, j = 1
The changes in three Propositions for this case will look as follows:
Ad Proposition 1:
Revise the inductive step for the case I = J as follows:
In this case we have
ϕ(x) = ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ ST21(J, y)).
Assume that:
a |=i ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ ST21(J, y)) (51)
(ām, a) A (b̄m, b) (52)
m + r(ϕ(x)) ≤ l (53)
Moreover, it follows from the definition of r that:
r(ϕ(x)) ≥ 1 (54)
r(ST21(J, y)) ≤ r(ϕ(x)) − 1 (55)
Now, by (51) choose a c ∈ Ui such that
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c |=i ST21(J, y) (57)
Since (53) and (54) clearly imply that m < l, it follows from (52) and (p-diam-1) that one can choose a 
d ∈ Uj , such that:
b Rj d (58)
(ām, a, c) A (b̄m, b, d) (59)
So, we get that:
m + 1 + r(ST21(J, y)) ≤ l (from (53) and (55)) (60)
d |=j ST21(J, y) (from (57), (59), (60) by IH) (61)
Finally, from (58) and (61) we infer that:
b |=j ∃y(R(x, y) ∧ ST21(J, y)),
and we are done.
Ad Proposition 2:
Replace the verification of conditions (p-diam-2(1)) and (p-diam-2(2)) with the following verification of 
condition (p-diam-1):
Take any (ām, a) A (b̄m, b) such that m < k and any c ∈ Ui such that a Ri c. In this case 
we will also have m + 1 ≤ k. Then consider tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mi, c). This set is non-empty, since by 
our assumption we have k − m − 1 ≥ 0. Therefore, as we have r(ST21(, x)) = 0, we will also have 
ST21(, x) ∈ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mi, c). Then, according to Lemma 1, there exists a finite non-empty set 
of logical equivalents for tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mi, c). Choosing this finite set, we in fact choose some finite 
{ ST21(I1, x) . . .ST21(Ip, x) } ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x), Mi, c) such that
(∀ψ(x) ∈ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, c))(ST21(I1, x) ∧ . . . ∧ ST21(Ip, x) |= ψ(x)).
But then we obtain that
a |=i ST21((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x).
In fact, c verifies this modalized conjunction for (Mi, a). But, given that
{ ST21(I1, x) . . .ST21(Ip, x) } ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, c),
the standard translation of modalized conjunction under consideration must be in tpk−m(ϕ(x), Mi, a). Note, 
further, that by (ām, a) A (b̄m, b) we have
tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mi, a) ⊆ tpk−m(ϕ(x),Mj , b),
and therefore this modalized conjunction must be true at (Mj, b) as well. But then take any d ∈ Uj such 
that b Rj d and d verifies the conjunction under consideration. By choice of { ST21(I1, x) . . .ST21(Ip, x) }
it follows that
tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mi, c) ⊆ tpk−m−1(ϕ(x),Mj , d).
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(b̄m, b, d), and so condition (p-diam-1) holds.
Ad Proposition 3:
Replace the verification of conditions (diam-2(1)) and (diam-2(2)) with the following verification of 
condition (diam-1):
Choose any i, j such that { i, j } = { 1, 2 }, any a ∈ Ui, b ∈ Uj such that a A b, that is to say, tpx(Mi, a) ⊆
tpx(Mj , b) and choose any c ∈ Ui for which we have a Ri c.
Consider tpx(Mi, c). If { ST21(I1, x) . . .ST21(Ip, x) } is a finite subset of this type, then we have
a |=i ST21((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x).
By tpx(Mi, a) ⊆ tpx(Mj , b), we obtain that
b |=j ST12((I1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ip), x).
This means that every finite subset of the type
{R(b, x) } ∪ tpx(Mi, c)
is satisfiable at [Mj , b]. Therefore, by compactness of first-order logic, this set is consistent with Th([Mj , b])
and, by ω-saturation of both M1 and M2, it must be satisfied in [Mj , b] by some d ∈ Uj . So for any such d
we will have b Rj d and, moreover,
d |=j tpx(Mi, c).
Thus we have that tpx(Mi, c) ⊆ tpx(Mj , d). Thus we get that c A d and condition (diam-1) is verified.
Another important revision of the proofs given in Section 5 for the case i = 2, j = 1 is the omission 
of every reference to relation B, since asimulations are now being defined as single relations rather than 
ordered couples of relations.
Finally, in order to accommodate the proofs in Section 5 to the case i = j = 1 one just needs to combine 
the revisions given in the present section in a straightforward way.
7. Characterization modulo first-order definable classes of models
In this section we show how to account for the impact of numerous sets of restrictions normally imposed 
on the Kripke models on the expressive powers of intuitionistic modal logic.
Indeed, Theorem 3 establishes a criterion for the equivalence of a first-order formula to an (i, j)-standard 
translation of modal intuitionistic formula over arbitrary first-order models for i, j ∈ {1, 2}. However, as we 
mentioned in Section 2, in modal intuitionistic logic only models satisfying some rather complicated set of 
restrictions are normally allowed. But, as we have also mentioned in that section, in most cases to be found 
in the existing literature, these restrictions can be formalized in first-order logic and thus jointly define a 
subclass κ of the class of first-order models. One is naturally interested in the criterion of equivalence of 
a first-order formula to an (i, j)-standard translation of modal intuitionistic formula over some intended 
subclass of models defined by a given set of such restrictions. Our answer is that this criterion is just 
invariance with respect to (i, j)-modal asimulations between the intended models.
More precisely, we define:
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1. κ(Θ) = { M ∈ κ | M is a Θ-model };
2. κ(Θ) is first-order axiomatizable iff there is a set Ax of Θ-sentences, such that a Θ-model M is in κ iff 
M |= Ax;
3. A set Γ of Θ-formulas is κ-satisfiable iff Γ is satisfied in some model of κ;
4. A Θ-formula ϕ κ-follows from Γ (Γ |=κ ϕ) iff Γ ∪ { ¬ϕ } is κ-unsatisfiable;
5. Θ-formulas ϕ and ψ are κ-equivalent iff ϕ |=κ ψ and ψ |=κ ϕ.
It is clear that for any class κ, such that Ax first-order axiomatizes κ(Θ), any set Γ of Θ-formulas and 
any Θ-formula ϕ, Γ is κ-satisfiable iff Γ ∪ Ax is satisfiable, and Γ |=κ ϕ iff Γ ∪Ax |= ϕ.
We say, further, that a formula ϕ(x) is κ-invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal asimulations (where 
i, j ∈ {1, 2}) iff it is invariant with respect to the class of (i, j)-modal asimulations connecting models in κ.
Now for the criterion of κ-equivalence to an (i, j)-standard translation of modal intuitionistic formula:
Theorem 5. Let κ be a class of first-order models such that κ(Θ) is first-order axiomatizable for all finite Θ, 
and let ϕ(x) be κ-invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal asimulations for some i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Then ϕ(x) is 
κ-equivalent to an (i, j)-standard translation of a modal intuitionistic formula.
Proof. Let Ax be the set of first-order sentences that axiomatizes κ(Σϕ). We may assume that ϕ(x) is 
κ(Σϕ)-satisfiable, otherwise ϕ(x) is κ-equivalent to STij(⊥, x) and we are done. In what follows we will 
write icκ(ϕ(x)) for the set
{ψ(x) ∈ intx(Σϕ) | ϕ(x) |=κ ψ(x)}.
Our strategy will be to show that icκ(ϕ(x)) |=κ ϕ(x). Once this is done we will conclude that
Ax ∪ icκ(ϕ(x)) |= ϕ(x).
Then we apply compactness of first-order logic and obtain that ϕ(x) is equivalent to a finite conjunction ∧
Ψ(x) of formulas from this set. But it follows then that ϕ(x) is κ-equivalent to the conjunction of the set 




And by Ψ(x) ⊆ Ax ∪ icκ(ϕ(x)) we have
Ax ∪ (icκ(ϕ(x)) ∩ Ψ(x)) |= ϕ(x)
and hence
icκ(ϕ(x)) ∩ Ψ(x) |=κ ϕ(x).
To show that icκ(ϕ(x)) |=κ ϕ(x), take any Σϕ-model M1 and a ∈ U1 such that M1 ∈ κ and a |=1
icκ(ϕ(x)). Then, of course, we will also have icκ(ϕ(x)) ⊆ tpx(M1, a). Such a model exists, because ϕ(x)
is κ(Σϕ)-satisfiable and icκ(ϕ(x)) will be κ-satisfied in any Σϕ-model satisfying ϕ(x). Then we can also 
choose a Σϕ-model M2 and b ∈ U2 such that M2 ∈ κ, b |=2 ϕ(x), and tpx(M2, b) ⊆ tpx(M1, a).
For suppose otherwise. Then for any Σϕ-model M ∈ κ such that U ⊆ N and any c ∈ U such that 
M, c |= ϕ(x) we can choose a modal intuitionistic formula I(M,c) such that STij(I(M,c), x) is in tpx(M, c)
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S = {ϕ(x) } ∪ {¬STij(I(M,c), x) | M ∈ κ,M, c |= ϕ(x) }.
Let { ϕ(x), ¬STij(I1, x) . . . , ¬STij(Iq, x) } be a finite subset of this set. If this set is κ-unsatisfiable, then we 
must have
ϕ(x) |=κ STij(I1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ STij(Iq, x),
but then we will also have
(STij(I1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ STij(Iq, x)) ∈ icκ(ϕ(x)) ⊆ tpx(M1, a),
and hence (STij(I1, x) ∨ . . . ∨ STij(Iq, x)) will be true at (M1, a). But then at least one of STij(I1, x) . . . ,
STij(Iq, x) must also be true at (M1, a), which contradicts the choice of these formulas. Therefore, every 
finite subset of S is κ-satisfiable. But then every finite subset of the set S ∪ Ax is satisfiable as well. By 
compactness of first-order logic S ∪ Ax is satisfiable, and, by Löwenheim–Skolem property of first-order 
logic, there is a Σϕ-model M ′ and g ∈ U ′ such that U ′ ⊆ N and (M ′, g) satisfies S ∪Ax. But then we must 
have M ′ ∈ κ, since M ′ is a Σϕ-model satisfying the set of axioms for κ(Σϕ).
For this model and for this element in it we will have both M ′, g |= STij(I(M ′,g), x) by choice of I(M ′,g)
and M ′, g |= STij(I(M ′,g), x) by the satisfaction of S, a contradiction.
Therefore, for any given Σϕ-model M1 such that M1 ∈ κ and for any a ∈ U1 satisfying icκ(ϕ(x)) we 
can choose a Σϕ-model M2 and b ∈ U2 such that M2 ∈ κ, b |=2 ϕ(x), and tpx(M2, b) ⊆ tpx(M1, a). Then, 
reasoning exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3, we conclude that a |=1 ϕ(x). Therefore, ϕ(x) in fact κ-follows 
from icκ(ϕ(x)). 
Theorem 6. Let κ be a class of first-order models such that for all finite Θ class κ(Θ) is first-order axiom-
atizable. Then a formula ϕ(x) is κ-invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal asimulations iff it is κ-equivalent 
to an (i, j)-standard translation of a modal intuitionistic formula.
Proof. From left to right our theorem follows from Theorem 5. In the other direction, assume that ϕ(x) is 
κ-equivalent to STij(I, x) and assume that for some Θ such that Σϕ ⊆ Θ, some Θ-models M1, M2, and 
some a ∈ U1 and b ∈ U2 such that M1, M2 ∈ κ, A is a (i, j)-modal asimulation from (M1, a) to (M2, b), 
and a |=1 ϕ(x). Then, since STij(I, x) is κ-equivalent to ϕ(x) and M1 is in κ, we also have a |=1 STij(I, x). 
From Theorem 3 it follows that b |=2 STij(I, x), but since STij(I, x) is κ-equivalent to ϕ(x) and M2 is in κ, 
we also have b |=2 ϕ(x). Therefore, ϕ(x) is κ-invariant with respect to (i, j)-modal asimulations. 
Thus Theorems 5 and 6 imply that (i, j)-modal asimulations as criteria for equivalence to a standard 
translation of a modal intuitionistic formula are easily scalable down to any first-order definable class of 
models.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have defined and vindicated four different versions of modal asimulations, capturing the 
four different fragments of classical first-order logic induced by the corresponding systems of satisfaction 
clauses for modal intuitionistic logic. In doing so, we were concentrating on different variants of Kripke 
semantics for intuitionistic modalities present in the existing literature.
However, it is easy to see that our approach is but an instance of a quite general algorithm that can be 
easily generalized to deal with a much wider class of extensions of intuitionistic propositional logic. We give 
90 G.K. Olkhovikov / Journal of Applied Logic 21 (2017) 57–90a description of one instance of such general algorithm (subsuming also the four cases at hand and some 
other results in the relevant literature, like, for example, [2]) in [12]. It is not clear at the moment how 
far generalizations of this type can reach; exploring this area is perhaps the most promising line of further 
research in the direction set by the present paper together with [10] and [11].
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